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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Markcus Raymond May appeals from the district court's dismissal, without a 
proper evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. (May 
was denied the request for police reports, affidavits, evidence, witnesses, and 
transcripts). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
May disputes the factual findings of the district court, and those stated 
by the states counsel's. And states the follwing as presented in his initial -
brief and post-dconviction affidavit: 
May was accosted and detained by highwaymen on a public road ( the 
so-called victim and two other men) who admittedly stood in the middle of 
the raod, knowing that May was approaching, and blocked him from moving 
forward in his vehicle. One highwaymen admittedly had a weapon on his 
person. Upon being 'heldup' on a public road by known assailants, whom had 
professed animosity towards May, May did exit his vehicle after procuring 
his own weapon and fired into an empty parked vehicle. Evidence requested 
by May stipulates that the victim, Lambert, was not shot by May, but 
injured from the ricochet of a piece of bull et that came off the parked 
vehicle. At no time has May stipulated that he was using drugs at the time 
of the incident it's self, nor has he claimed he was hallucinating or in 
amental state at the time of the incident, only that his mental state 
should have been taken into account for sentencing pruposes. All of which 
is irrelevant due to the fact that may had a right to defend once stopped 
by the highwaymen, regardless of how he had to endure to do it. Scared, 
may left the scene. However, May's use of drugs prior to that day, or his 
illogical actions after the incident, in no way diminish his right to 
defend on a public road, and to want to present the evidence that 
supported such claims at a trial, prior to sentencing. 
May insisted from the onset of the criminal proceedings that his 
attorney, Ben Anderson go to trial and prove May had a right to defend. 
Anderson refused to present May's defense, or investigate the victims 
actions and claims. When Anderson would not defend May, or prepare for 
trail, May went before the court in December 2010 demanding that the court 
Order Anderson to prepare for trial and present his defense, or disqualify 
him and provide conflict counsel. The court refused to order Anderson, or 
provide alternative counsel. the state has refused to provide the 
appellant with these transcripts for evidentiary purposes. Upon having no 
ability to go to trial or present a defense as requested and demanded, May 
had no choice and was courced and forced by counsel and the courts 
decision to plead guilty, even though he had already asserted actual 
innocence with colorable evidence to support it through the victims own 
statements of stopping May on the public road. plead guilty January 2011. 
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It needs to be made clear that the evidence that the highwaymen 
blocked the road, were armed with firearms, and had intent to stop and 
hurt the Petitioner-Appellant is already on filed in the criminal appeal's 
police reports, transcripts of the preliminary hearing, and that it was a 
piece of a bullit not directed at the victim, is readily available for the 
court to determine. 
When May plead guilty, having no choice, he immediately attempted to 
withdraw the plea within 48 hours through consel, Anderson. when Anderson 
refused to entertain the motion, May sent a notice to the court of his 
intent to withdraw and refusal to further retain Anderson under any 
circumstances. It took three weeks to get Anderson off the case. The court 
finally hired Tim Williams in March 2011. Williams immediately submitted a 
Motion To Withdraw Plea based on May's claims and innocence. The court 
improperly denied the motion without any consideration for May's innocence 
claims or his right to receive a trial based on colorable evidence of 
innocence due to self defense. 
May was sentenced in May 2011, seven months after asserting his 
innocence and Six months after requesting a trial and wanting to withdraw 
his plea. 
On appeal, May's appellate attorney, Spencer Haun refused to plead the 
actual innocence claim as a viable defense and cause to withdraw his plea, 
creating inefffective assistance of counsel, same as Anderson and 
Williams. May has a right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel 
against trial and appellate counsel, and their inadequate argument 
concerning May's actual innocence claim removes the states argument that 
the withdraw of plea claim is subject to res judicata and cannot be raised 
in post-conviction, where it was raised based on counsels ineffectivness. 
The state has refused to provide the Petitioner-Appellant with the 
document's requested on appeal, as also did the trial court at evidentiary 
proceedins. This is not due process. Hiding the truth is not the same as 
proving the truth. May has a right to have the evidence that supports his 
claims provided to him. It's not that much of a burden on the state to 
provide the documents, other than the fact that it disproves their 
contentions and proves that May had a colorable claim of innocence that 
dictated that he be allowed to fire counsel first, and proceed to trial 
second. 
Considering the comp 1 ete denial of access to the court May suffered 
from through Anderson and the court refusing to disqualify him, any of 
May's actions regardless of the states quickness to point them out (Plea 
Advisory form), is irrelevant. may asserted innocence, wanted to go to 
trial and get a lawyer who would do so, the court was fully aware of this, 
and disregarded it completely, prejudicing May and his right to access to 
a fair trial and present a defense. This level of denial of access to the 
courts does in fact chi 11 the defendant's cons ti tuti ona l protections and 
leaves him with little hope of being able to assert any right, and leaves 
him courced to plead guilty, this is not a valid plea or conviction. 
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ISSUES 
May disputes the states practice of res ta ting the issues presented on 
appeal in their reply brief. The issues are as the Appellant states them, 
c'1:1ngi ng them alters the cons ti tuti ona l pri nci pl es that apply. they are in 
cr1ct: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing a plea withdrawal prior 
to sentencing; and whether the district court erred in determining that Mr. 
May's plea was knowing; willing; and without duress? 
2. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. may's 
Post-Conviction Petition without applying an actual innocence standard of 




Claims that have previously been raised to and decided by the court are not 
barred under post-conviction proceedures act, if they are than raised under 
post conviction act pursuant to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
A. Introduction 
Appellate counsel failed to raise the fact that May asserted actual 
innocence and demanded a trial with out Ben Anderson, which was denied by the 
court, forcing May to make a plea where he felt there was no choice because 
counsel refused to go to trial and the cdourt agreed with counsel. This is an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim which is premitted in post-conviction 
proceedings. 
B. Standard of Review 
The United States Supreme Court has rulled that errors committed by 
counsel at trial and on appeal may be raised in collateral proceedings 
(post-conviction) pyursuant to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See: 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). Res Judicata does not apply. 
C. May's claim that counsel was ineffective in raising the issue on direct 
appeal properly and without an actual innocence standard of review and argument 
and without obtaining the evidence supporting it for appellate review is 
cognizable in post-conviction and the states attempt to hide that fact is again 
denial of access to the court and a violation of the post-conviction procedures 




May has shown that the district court erred by dismissing his petition for 
post-con vi ctfon rel i e-F 1,Ji th out pro vi ding proper evi den ti ary proceedings and 
applying an actual innocence standard of review and timelyness of the request. 
A. Intoduction 
At evi den ti ary in the post-conviction proceedings. the court refused to 
provide May with the documents, transcripts, and police reports that supported 
his claims, namely the transcript from the hearing where he asserted actual 
innocence, requested that counsel be fired for refusing to go to trial, and 
requested counsel that would present his defense of actual innocence. This 
hearing and the transcripts that supported the claims was paramount to May's 
claims. and the police reports establishing that the asdsaiulants were 
highwaymen, armed, and ballistics report that proved that May did not directly 
fire at the victim were also necessary for evidentiary purposes and essential 
to the claim, and therefore the hearing was nothing more than a summary 
Judgment hearing, not an evidentiary hearing, which denied May due process. 
Furthermore, the hearings and their trnascripts established the timeliness 
of the request for non-conflict counsel and the timeliness of the plea 
withdrawal, well before sentencing. It also was clear that the prejudice to 
May's actual innocence claim by not allowing a trial, once the claimwas made, 
is without question readily obvious under constitutional standards. 
B. Standard of Review 
The court ~ay not temper it's liberality when an actual innocence claim is 
made, with colorable evidence, prior to trial, and a motion to withdraw plea is 
asserted ·:timely (48 hours in this case) after entry and well before trial 
and/or sentencing, and prejudice to the defendant has been established by the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (counsel's failure and refusal to 
prepare and go to trial. Part of the voluntariness of a plea is the clear right 
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and knowing access to proceed to trial if requested and wanted. May's chilled 
constitutional protections clearly contributed to his plea of guilty, where he 
believed and was tempered by the court to accept counsels refusal to proceed to 
trial and refusal to prepare an actual innocence defense. May was clearly under 
the direct counsel of the court to keep counsel and counsel's demenor 
(ineffectivness and refusal to go to or prepare for trial). 
May essentially challenged the indictment and asserted that it failed to 
state a charge in December, 2010. He admitted his actions as a defense, and 
thus his actions were not a crime. A charging document will be deemed so flawed 
that is fails to confer jurisdiction on the court if the facts alleged are not 
made criminal by statute or if the document fails to state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged. State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 621, 623, 21 P.3d 
943, 945 (Ct.App.2001); Hays v. State, 113 Idaho736, 739, 747 P.2d 758, 761 
(Ct.App.1987); aff'd, 115 Idaho 315, 316, 766 P.2d 785, 786 (1988). A 
Jurisdictional defect is not vJaived by a guilty plea, Byington, 135 Idaho at 
623, 21 P.3d at 945, the timing of May's challenge to the information, coming 
before the plea was entered in December, 2010, and the request for a trial than 
and in December 2010, and the plea being entered in January 2011, and two days 
later requesting to withdraw the plea and firing Anderson of his own accord, 
affects the level of scrutiny that applys in evaluating the sufficiency of tie 
information. If an alleged deficiency is raised by a defendant before trial or 
entry of a guilty plea, the charging document must state all facts essential to 
establish the charged offense, State v. Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165,168, 75 P.3d 
219, 222 (Ct.App.2003); Byington, 135 Idaho at 623, 21 P.3d at 945. And the 
affirmative defense implied by the defendant applied to those facts in 
correlation with the facts that support his claim of innocence, prior to trial. 
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III. 
May made a timely request to withdraw his plea, and had "just reason" to do so, 
that being his actual innocence claim and ineffective assistance of counsel. 
A. Introduction 
Neither the implied sentence, presentence report (which had not been filed 
yet), nor any other outside factor except that already on record, that of 
actual innocence and counsel's failure to prepare and present a defense and go 
to trial dictated the request to withdrawal the plea and go to trial. No 
impermissible motives were presented by May or asserted by May nor were any 
impermissible factors relevant after actual innocence and ineffectivness was 
asserted. 
B. Standard of Review 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), the withdrawal of a guilty plea may be 
allowed in the trial court's discretion. The scope of that discretion is 
affected by the timing of the request or motion. Where the motion is filed 
before sentencing, the defendant need only show a "just reason'' for withdrawing 
the plea. !.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 
1151, 1153 (1988); State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512,516, 861 P.2d 82,86 
(Ct.App.1992); State v. Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411, 816 P.2d 364,367 
(Ct.App.1991); State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137,139, 765 P.2d 162,164 
(Ct.App.1988). 
In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary, and voluntariness 
requires that the defendant understand the nature of the charges to which he is 
pleading guilty. Part of that understanding is a clear evaluation of an 
affirmative defense if asserted, and the desire to present such a defense at 
trial, and the knowing ability to do so if requested and wanted. Telling a 
defendsant he has no defense, cannot present one, and may not proceed to trial, 
and than excepting his plea of guilty because he has no choice is not knowing 
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willing and voluntary. Believing he has no choice cannot be construed as knowing 
in any sense of the concept of a willing plea. Boykin v. alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). 
The affirmative defense and actual innocence claim and request for a trial 
to present that defense was not explained to May in respect to why, if any 
reason existed, he could not do so, only that the denial was effectuated 
through refusal to fire counsel. the intent element was not explained to May, 
as it applies to an affirmative defense. Meaning, intent is irelevant or not a 
crime if he had a right to defend. may entered the plea without having adequate 
notice of the offense to which he was pleading guilty to. Henderson v. Morgan, 
426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). Intent is such a critical 
element of an offense, that notice of that element is required, especially as 
it relates to an actual innocence claim of self defense. Morgan, 426 U.S. at 
647 n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2253 n. 18. 
Idaho Court's held that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied a subsequent motion to withdraw a guilty pl ea on the ground that the 
defendant had not been informed of the intent element of the crime. See: 
State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho at 414, 744 P.2d at 798. 
May points out that he was informed by counsel and the court that intent 
was irrelevant, a defense was irrelevant, and he had no choise but to proceed 
without one, and plead guilty. 
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IV. 
May presented his claims in his post-conviction pursuant to an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, both trial counsel and appellate counsel. His 
evidencre, being both the transcripts and police reports and ballistics 
reports, was not allowed to be presented, at any time. 
A. Introduction 
At no time has May's claims been evaluated based on ineffective assistance 
of counsel. neither his attempt to fire counsel prior to pleading, nor his 
assertion that appellate counsel failed to represent his actual innocence 
claims. The evidence that he was the one who was stopped by highwaymen, armed, 
and out to get him, was presented by the victims own testimony at the 
preliminary hearing. counsel's refusal to develope this evidence and present it 
in at a trial to prove May's innocence is obvious ineffectivness, not to 
men ti on prosecutori al misconduct and judicial misconduct for suppressing it 
when May attempted to withdraw his plea and go to trial. 
B. Standard of Review 
A defendant seeking relief for ineffective assistance of counsel must show 
both that the attorney's representation was deficient and that the defendant 
was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This requires a showing that the defense attorney 
made errors so serious that the attorney was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. To satisfy the 
prejudice prong, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel's errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 
2052; Aragomn v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761, 760 P.2d 1174,1177 (1988). When it 
is asserted that a guilty plea was the product of ineffective assistance, to 
prove the prejudice prong the defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59, 
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106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). See also Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 
76,82, 57 P.3d 787,793 (2002); Menchaca v. State, 128 Idaho 649,652, 917 P.2d 
806,809 (Ct.App.1996). 
May has made every attempt to get the state to produce the transcripts and 
police reports to him sdo he can present them to this court. the state wants to 
deny them, and than complain that May has not proven his claims, which are 
in fact proven from the hearing where he tried to fire Anderson as counsel, and 
the report's showing that the assailiants (highwaymen) had intentionally 
stopped him, were armed, and intent on hurting him. for the state to deny the 
documents, than complain the facts hasve not been presented when they hold the 
facts prejudicially, is not due process, and is misconduct at best. 
The courts are required to order discovery on application for 
post-conbviction relief, if it is necessary to protect the applicant's 
substantive riughts. The appellate courts are also held to that same standard. 
I.C. § 19-4906; Criminal Rule 57(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Miy respectfully requests that this court grant May's request to withdraw 
his plea of guilty, vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence, and allow 
him to proceed to trial on an actual innocence claim based on an affirmative 
defense of his right to defend against being stopped by highwaymen on a public 
road, armed, and intent on doing him harm. 
Or an and other relief so deemed just and necessary by this honorable 
court. 
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I, Markcus Raymond May , hereby certify that on This_2_day of 
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